Television and Politics in the Former East Germany by Dittmar, Claudia
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 
ISSN 1481-4374 
Purdue University Press ©Purdue University 
Volume 7 (2005) Issue 4 Article 3 
Television and Politics in the Former East Germany 
Claudia Dittmar 
University of Halle-Wittenberg 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb 
 Part of the Comparative Literature Commons, and the Critical and Cultural Studies Commons 
Dedicated to the dissemination of scholarly and professional information, Purdue University Press selects, develops, and distributes 
quality resources in several key subject areas for which its parent university is famous, including business, technology, health, 
veterinary medicine, and other selected disciplines in the humanities and sciences. 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in the humanities and 
social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative literature and the field of cultural 
studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English 
Language and Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities Index 
(Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern Language Association of 
America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University Press monograph series of Books in Comparative 
Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu> 
Recommended Citation 
Dittmar, Claudia. "Television and Politics in the Former East Germany." CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 
7.4 (2005): <https://doi.org/10.7771/1481-4374.1279> 
This text has been double-blind peer reviewed by 2+1 experts in the field. 
The above text, published by Purdue University Press ©Purdue University, has been downloaded 2402 times as of 11/
07/19. Note: the download counts of the journal's material are since Issue 9.1 (March 2007), since the journal's 
format in pdf (instead of in html 1999-2007). 
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. Please contact 
epubs@purdue.edu for additional information. 
This is an Open Access journal. This means that it uses a funding model that does not charge readers or their institutions for 
access. Readers may freely read, download, copy, distribute, print, search, or link to the full texts of articles. This journal is covered 
under the CC BY-NC-ND license. 
   UNIVERSITY PRESS <http://www.thepress.purdue.edu> 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture  
 
ISSN 1481-4374 <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb> 
Purdue University Press ©Purdue University 
 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture, the peer-reviewed, full-text, and open-access learned journal in 
the humanities and social sciences, publishes new scholarship following tenets of the discipline of comparative 
literature and the field of cultural studies designated as "comparative cultural studies." In addition to the 
publication of articles, the journal publishes review articles of scholarly books and publishes research material 
in its Library Series. Publications in the journal are indexed in the Annual Bibliography of English Language and 
Literature (Chadwyck-Healey), the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (Thomson Reuters ISI), the Humanities 
Index (Wilson), Humanities International Complete (EBSCO), the International Bibliography of the Modern 
Langua-ge Association of America, and Scopus (Elsevier). The journal is affiliated with the Purdue University 
Press monog-raph series of Books in Comparative Cultural Studies. Contact: <clcweb@purdue.edu> 
 
 
CLCWeb Volume 7 Issue 4 (December 2005) Article 3 
Claudia Dittmar,  
"Television and Politics in the Former East Germany" 
<http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol7/iss4/3> 
 
Contents of CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 7.4 (2005) 
Thematic Issue Media and Communication Studies at the University of Halle-Wittenberg 




Abstract: In her paper, "Television and Politics in the Former East Germany," Claudia Dittmar 
analyzes how in the former East Germany (GDR) while television audience was restricted severly 
by government, at the same time West German broadcasts acquired a substantial audience and 
what the impact of these broadcasts had on the audience. West German television programs en-
joyed a high level of popularity with the East German population, thereby posing the greatest 
competition to the GDR's own television stations. As a result, GDR television was forced to coun-
teract the impact of West German television. Dittmar discusses how the West German media were 
accused of attempting to influence the East German audience ideologically and how the leadership 
of the GDR sought this to prevent by all means. The resulting competition on the airwaves forced 
the television stations of the GDR to adapt to the wishes of its audience, even if this meant that 
entertainment won the upper hand over the mediation of socialist politics and policies: Popular 
programs of West German television were countered with programs of mass appeal produced in 
the GDR. 
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Television and Politics in the Former East Germany 
 Translated from the German by Benjamin Kraft 
 
In the former East Germany (GDR), television encompassed more than just "television." What held 
true for its audience also applied to those in charge of the television channels and their programs, 
namely one eye always peering towards West German television and its programs. The "enemy" 
on the airwaves -- radio and television -- did not just seduce viewers away from GDR television, it 
also impacted on the design and content of its programs and was always seen as the measure of 
reference of the merits and quality of GDR television. Even today, when analysing GDR television 
more than ten years after its dissolution, it is important to pay attention to the the impact of the 
competition between the two German television systems. Thus, the research project of the pro-
gram history of GDR television -- a project conducted by scholars in media and communication 
studies at the University of Halle-Wittenberg <http://www.ddr-fernsehen.de> -- is executed with 
the comparative approach. In the present paper, I discuss selected aspects of the concrete circum-
stances of this power struggle at the managerial levels of GDR television and I begin with the 
question: If it is true that East German television reacted to West German television in many re-
spects, then there must be evidence of this on an institutional level. Based on this hypothesis it 
should then also be possible to analyse the history of GDR television as the history of a continuous 
battle to retain its audience, as a history of conflicts with an "enemy" that the GDR was unable to 
prevent from infiltrating its territory. In fact, not only have individual program types have refer-
enced their West German counterparts as a result, the entire program development was influenced 
by this fact. In the research project at hand, following the project's methodology of studying indi-
vidual time periods, these analyses were conducted for the timeframe between 1968 and 1974. 
This period represents a watershed for GDR television, the phase of consolidation (since 1962) and 
the phase of differentiation of GDR television (until 1982). At its center lies political and cultural 
upheaval, namely the changeover of the country's leadership from Walter Ulbricht to Erich 
Honecker in 1971. The said political reorientation included a large impact on television and cultural 
liberalization as well as a movement towards internationalization occurred. In turn, this resulted in 
a stronger emphasis on the entertainment function of television programs. Beyond this, television 
was reorganized radically in the first year of the change in power: This took the shape of a newly 
founded state committee of television at the Council of Ministers of the GDR. This had an organiza-
tional dissociation from the state's radio stations as a consequence. The changes in the wake of 
the catalyst of the changes, namely the 8th Convention of the Communist Party of the GDR, also 
led to revolutionary changes in television programming, realized in the first program reform of 
GDR television in 1971-72 (the introduction of a second television channel and of color television 
also fall into this period). 
The period of 1968 to 1974 represents, also, an especially interesting history of the competi-
tion with West German television. Since the political relations between the two German states 
changed decisively during this time, these years also witnessed revolutionary developments in the 
competition between their media. Even as late as the mid-1960s, GDR television was fighting with 
great self-confidence to reach viewers in West Germany, as the following quote from the terms of 
cooperation between the Deutsche Post and the Deutscher Fernsehfunk from the year 1968 sug-
gests: "By aggressively exerting influence on millions of viewers in West Germany and West Berlin, 
in the conflict with the class enemy, the historic mission of our Republic shall be depicted vividly, 
the peaceful democratic forces in West Germany and West Berlin shall be supported in their strug-
gle, and proof shall be given in word and image that the GDR is at least one historical era ahead of 
West Germany" (Bundesarchiv Berlin DR 8-79 1a; unless indicated otherwise, all translations are 
by Benjamin Kraft). This kind of attempted influence on the "enemy" nation was at and parcel of 
the self-perception of GDR television from its inception (see Vollberg). However, this directive and 
attitude changed towards the end of the 1960s, when strategies and goals were switched to the 
audience of GDR television. This brings up the question what changed for the GDR and for those in 
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charge of television and television programming. Simply put, both the way the GDR's self-
perception and its view of other nations had developed and changed to a great degree. The GDR 
found itself in a new phase of national sovereignty, one that meant simultaneously that it was fol-
lowing a strategy of distancing itself from the other German state. The party leadership concen-
trated its efforts on having the GDR recognized as a nation having equal rights under international 
law. Of course, this objective was hindered by West Germany and it was only thanks to the policy 
of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union that allowed a normalization of the 
tense relations between the two German states. The leadership of the GDR had thus reached an 
important milestone in its foreign policy while at the same time had to fend off the negative effects 
of this development in the form of a policy of détente. A harmonization with West Germany held 
risks that the party leadership sought to defuse by a dual strategy. On the one hand, it intensified 
its close ties with its "brother land," the Soviet Union; on the other hand, it emphasized the disso-
ciation from its class enemy, West Germany. As a result, these developments by no means meant 
a de-escalation of the media rivalry between the two German states but instead an intensified bat-
tle against the "enemy's invading TV program." Finally, the GDR accused West Germany of trying 
to influence the citizens of the GDR by means of the media: "It must be taken into account that we 
are faced with an enemy in the form of a very well-equipped machinery of ideological diversion, an 
enemy whom we have indeed been able to expel from our territory but not from the field of ideo-
logical conflict, and who is adept building on any ideological backwardness and any lapses in so-
cialist societal education by utilizing all available means of mass seduction" (Glatzer 321-22). 
The directors of the GDR's television also had to deal with the changed situation and its conse-
quences for its program following the -- previously mentioned -- 8th party convention of the GDR 
Communist Party of 1971. At a consultation of the party's working group employed at the 
Deutscher Fernsehfunk, the then head of GDR television, Heinz Adameck, summed this up as fol-
lows: "The party convention has shown us that we should expect to see a further intensification of 
the ideological class struggle. It emphasized once again the basic duty of the mass media to con-
tribute to the ideological dissociation by immunizing our population against the poison of anti-
communism. ... The fight against an anti-communist diversion therefore means developing an un-
derstanding for the following questions: peaceful coexistence means a difficult class struggle and 
does not result in rapprochement with but in demarcation against the imperialistic Federal Republic 
of Germany" (Bundesarchiv Berlin DY 30-478 II/10-II/11). Adameck emphasized that a clear mis-
sion for GDR television could be derived from this statement, namely "to create primarily a social-
ist television program that is so attractive and so effective that fewer citizens will wish to satisfy 
their needs of entertainment and information with the help of West-TV" (Bundesarchiv Berlin DY 
30-478 II/11). Seen in this context, it becomes clear why the agitation aimed at the West had lost 
its momentum and the concept that the program had a mandate to reach all of Germany was 
abandoned in the course of this political re-orientation. An outward sign of this change was the 
renaming of the "Deutscher Fernsehfunk" to "Fernsehen der DDR" in 1972. From this point on, 
television as a mass medium was strengthened as an instrument of propaganda used on the coun-
try's own population and audience. This was achieved by offering two channels, by increasing con-
tinuously the number of hours that programs were broadcast and by developing the programs in 
accordance with the audience's needs. 
In the years after the dissolution of the East German state, most scholars of media assumed 
that the population of the former East Germany "turned their eyes and ears towards the West" 
collectively (see, e.g., Dohlus 80). A (first) analysis of television audience in the former East Ger-
many in 1991 seemed to support what (West) German media scholars had suspected, namely that 
the population of the GDR preferred West German television and had abandoned GDR television in 
the last decade of its existence increasingly (see Dohlus; Braumann). However, ten years after the 
disbandment of GDR television new studies pertaining to GDR audiences' reception patterns and 
behavior indicate a high popularity of GDR television. For example, Michael Meyen counters the 
theory of the collective departure of the population that supposedly occurred every evening. His 
analysis suggests that the importance of Western media and especially of West German television 
has been overrated. Meyen is not surprised that the idea of "virtual desertion" was not met with 
Claudia Dittmar, "Television and Politics in the Former East Germany"         page 4 of 9 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 7.4 (2005): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol7/iss4/3> 
 
disagreement for many years. After all, it "flattered the West German journalists and legitimized 
their Germany-wide mandate, or maybe because it just did not seem conceivable that GDR citizens 
could not be interested in information from the 'free world'" (Meyen 228). Yet, it is this very disin-
terest that Meyen was able to establish in his study. By re-analyzing the findings of audience re-
ception and behavior and by drawing on additional media-biographical interviews he comes to the 
conclusion that the GDR television adience expected the programs to supply them with entertain-
ment and relaxation, both of which they found in their "own" media. The interviews with contem-
porary witnesses showed that especially women, who did not have much free time owing to their 
multiple burdens of family, employment, and household work, showed very little interest in news 
broadcasts from West German television stations. It is especially important to mention Meyen's 
findings on the higher number of viewers: He determines that, on a yearly average, the two chan-
nels of GDR television reached more East German viewers with their 8 p.m. programs than the 
competing West German stations. Studies on the viewers' time budgets showed that no more than 
55-60% of viewers in the GDR who owned a television actually watched it during prime time. As-
suming that the two GDR stations held a share of 35-40% of the viewers, this leaves the West 
German stations with a maximum viewer share of 20-25% (see Meyen 222). Meyen sees this au-
dience behavior as a constant value which changed only after the political changes of 1989. This 
also refutes the frequently discussed decline in viewership in the 1980s (on this, see Hoff; 
Hickethier; Schwarzkopf). What is certain now is that GDR television reached its audience with 
programs of entertainment produced not in West Germany but in the GDR. The two program re-
forms of 1971-72 and 1982-83, through which the entertainment aspect was strengthened, sug-
gest that the directors in charge of the programs must have been aware of this development and 
audience preference. This is emphasized by the fact that the success of the entertainment formats 
was accompanied by a pronounced rejection of information and journalism formats. Shows of the-
se formats were more likely to cause the audience to change the channel (see Meyen 217). Focus-
ing on entertainment shows, on the other hand, we can come to the conclusion that audiences did 
not find GDR television pograms boring – "at least no more so than West German TV" (Meyen 
225). As motivations for watching programs of GDR television Meyen argues that viewers were 
able to recognize stars, people, places, and their own everyday life in the shows (225). Thus, the 
West German media was no alternative to this "processing of the own identity," because "most 
advisory (how-to) shows were not applicable to life in the East and news shows and political shows 
were only of limited value in helping with the viewer's orientation in everyday life" (226).  
As suggested previously, the 8th Communist Party Convention had given television the clear 
task of orienting its program in accordance with the wishes of its audience. For his colleagues, 
Adameck summarized this mission as follows: "The principles of overall program design as well as 
the conception of the individual sectors, the suggested topics for the individual programs, and last-
ly the methods of the journalistic or artistic approach of a topic need to meet the requirements 
that the party convention has identified as the basis for our work: the growing material and cultur-
al needs of the public, which also includes an improved fulfillment of the audience's expectations, 
as well as the improvement of the working and living conditions" (Bundesarchiv Berlin DY 30-478 
1/7). At the same time, Adameck called for a critical view of the GDR's own television program: 
"Self-delusion and illusions will not help us affect the necessary changes to our program, because 
they make us close our eyes to the real societal expectations and the requirements of the viewers" 
(Bundesarchiv Berlin DY 30-478 1/20 ). On the whole, the television ideologists did not relinquish 
the concept that they would be able to practice "impact politics" with their program. Using the en-
tire spectrum of their program, they aimed to tackle their societal mission "to strengthen the so-
cialist consciousness and for the intellectual and cultural good of the people of the GDR" 
(Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Thesen zur Funktion" 2). Those in charge did not only 
assume that television as a medium satisfied the goals of their "impact politics" especially well be-
cause of its pervasiveness: All efforts that were aimed at establishing the television program "with 
its numerous prospects for impact" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Thesen zur Funktion" 
2) can be explained with the knowledge of the special power of persuasion of this medium. Be-
cause of its effect of authenticity and its emotional impact, the moving image, which could be re-
Claudia Dittmar, "Television and Politics in the Former East Germany"         page 5 of 9 
CLCWeb: Comparative Literature and Culture 7.4 (2005): <http://docs.lib.purdue.edu/clcweb/vol7/iss4/3> 
 
ceived and viewed in the privacy of the home, television was considered to be superior to any oth-
er medium. Owing to this potential, it would be "an unpardonable sin of omission ... in the work of 
the mass media of the GDR to lead the battle for the awareness of millions by utilizing only the 
daily press" (Glatzer 21-22). However, according to the perception of the Central Committee's De-
partment of Propaganda (Abteilung Agitation des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei 
Deutschlands), television's specific mode of operation was also tied in with its own dilemma which 
was not to be underestimated: "Socialist television is simultaneously an instrument of political in-
formation and orientation, of ideological education, of intellectual and cultural enrichment, of re-
laxation, and of entertainment. The overall program design must therefore always bear all of these 
factors in mind. ... It is just as wrong to yield to demands that are detrimental to the fulfillment of 
socialist television's political-ideological function as it is unjustifiable to ignore the viewers' legiti-
mate and distinct need for relaxation and entertainment. Television is to a great extent responsible 
for making every citizen feel good in [a socialist system]" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, 
"Thesen zur Funktion" 6). 
"For the Bonn republic, the existing three television stations are highly important tools in the 
class struggle. With the imperialists' own methods of misrepresentation, untruth, fabrication, and 
agitation they are anxious to influence ideologically viewers in both German states every day." 
This quote, taken from "Bericht der Intendanz und der Zentralen Parteileitung des Deutschen 
Fernsehfunks über den Stand der Durchführung der Beschlüsse des 11. Plenums des ZK der SED 
Beilage 4, S.1" ("Report of the Intendants and the Central Party Leadership of the Deutscher 
Fernsehfunk on the Status of the Execution of the Resolutions of the 11th Plenum of the SED's 
Central Committee, Addendum 4, p.1") of 1966, demonstrates what a decidedly hostile image 
West German television was given. The report is especially noteworthy for its detailed listing of 
facts about West German television. The collected information pertains to its program, the number 
of viewers, personnel, technical equipment, and the economic principles on which the program sta-
tions ARD, ZDF, and the third programs operated. Within these categories, data on the Deutscher 
Fernsehfunk are also listed for comparison and these suggest the inferiority of GDR television. For 
example, while ARD and ZDF could boast a total of twenty studios, the DFF had only one and while 
the West German television stations had 10,775 full-time employees, there were only 2,354 work-
ing for the East's sole counterpart at the time. Also, the financial situation of the television institu-
tions in East and West Germany were hardly comparable: Where the West German stations had 
access to funds totaling about one billion and 110 million West German Marks in 1965, the GDR's 
stations had to make do with 127 million East German Marks [while at the time the two German 
Marks were taken to be 1:1 officially, in reality the value of the West German Mark was about 
1:4,4 re the East German Mark; thus, East German television's funding was 1:38 when compared 
with that of the West German funding for its television]). Further, for the East German television 
station, an extension of this was the sobering comparison of technical equipment: "The ... equip-
ment of the West German studios is state-of-the-art: some will be modernized in regard to color 
television capabilities over the next years. ... West German studios have seventy magnetic image 
storage systems and ca. forty outside broadcasting vans at their disposal" (Berlin DY 30-481, Ad-
dendum 4 2-3). In contrast, there were "five magnetic image-storage systems, two of which are 
completely new developments and not yet completely serviceable" and "ten outside broadcasting 
vans, of which ... seven have been in service for up to ten years and are technologically obsolete" 
(Bundesarchiv Berlin DY 30-481, Addendum 4 4). There is no trace of over-estimating the GDR 
television station's capabilities in these documents, there was no doubt about the West Germans' 
economic, manpower-related, and technological superiority. This state of affairs persisted over the 
following years and was repeatedly a topic in the correspondence of GDR television functionaries, 
always supported by new figures. Further, it was insinuated that West German television was de-
manding that the socialist states (the Soviet block of Central and East Europe) lessen their ideo-
logical influence on society while at the same time aiming "for a greater development, propaga-
tion, and exploitation of middle-class moral and middle-class political ethics with the goal of im-
plementing the strategic concepts of imperialism" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Einige 
Tendenzen" 2). Supposedly, the state employed the medium television "to replace the thinking of 
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the citizens ... with ... central political-moral principles and to polarize the existing, diffuse intellec-
tual, cultural, and moral concepts in the interest of an emergence of an awareness shared by soci-
ety as a whole. The passive behavioral pattern of the masses that has been stimulated for years is 
to be overcome and transformed into a political activity that affirms the imperialistic state and 
serves reactionary goals" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Einige Tendenzen" 2). A con-
crete example of what such a political (ab)use would look like is not supplied, however. 
In addition to the supposed attempts at manipulation of their own population and television 
audience, the authors of the report were especially interested in the media-based realization of the 
state doctrine of "anti-communism" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Einige Tendenzen" 
3). This doctrine is portrayed as a great danger to the GDR, since "ideological diversion as the 
principal component of psychological warfare is currently the most important form in the achieve-
ment of anticommunist goals and intentions" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Einige 
Tendenzen" 3). Here, the report suggests that the "cold war" was conducted in a "hot" manner to 
all intents and purposes, as it accuses West German television of "attempted ideological infiltra-
tion" of the GDR. Employing all genres of television, it was believed that on the one hand, the 
West German population was to be "immunized against progressive ideas" (Deutsches 
Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Einige Tendenzen" 5) and on the other that "a permanent fomenting 
of reformist and revisionist endeavors" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Einige Tendenzen" 
6) in the East-bloc countries was being conducted. These "attempts at interference" by West Ger-
man television specifically aimed at its East German neighbor are described in a concept paper in 
1970 by the research group for planning of the journalism section at Karl Marx University: "The 
ideological diversion of the Bonn republic and the organizations and institutions cooperating with it 
will continue to be aimed at pitting the citizens and the state of he GDR against each other, to ma-
neuver them apart, and – since a schism can not be achieved – to at least create and nurture par-
tial differences" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Ideologische Leitlinie" 12). More specifi-
cally, West German television is accused of "the attempt to depict the party of the working class as 
an obstacle to societal progress" and of practicing "the rapprochement of the two systems" 
(Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Ideologische Leitlinie" 13). This was to be reached by the 
"attempt to reduce the behavior of the citizens of the GDR to making demands," while at the same 
time spurring on "consumer desires" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Ideologische 
Leitlinie" 13). The authors of the paper "Einige Tendenzen der politisch-ideologischen 
Manipulierung im westdeutschen Fernsehen" even went so far as to accuse television of conducting 
the mobilization for an armed conflict through entertainment offerings: "In 1968, the subliminal 
exertion of influence in the service of psychological preparation for war was most notably height-
ened in serials and crime movies. According to sociological studies, men between the age of 16 to 
36 make up the majority of the potential viewers. ... In this manner, the exact part of the popula-
tion is reached that constitutes a special focal point in the framework of psychological warfare" 
(Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Einige Tendenzen" 7). And the harshest allegations were 
aimed at the ARD where the report surmises that this station "is following a special agenda in the 
overall process of psychological warfare against the GDR compared to the ZDF" (Deutsches 
Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Einige Tendenzen" 6-7). Furthermore, this was considered especially 
true of the WDR (Cologne) and the SFB (Berlin), whose broadcasts were "to be characterized as 
especially aggressive" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Einige Tendenzen" 6). 
These "observations" in the said reports seem to have roused further interest. In the paper 
"Information -- Rolle und Stellung des Senders Freies Berlin" of March 1972, this ARD institute is 
analyzed extensively as "an ideological 'stake in the flesh of the GDR'" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv 
Babelsberg, "Information" 2). In addition to presenting the collected information on the institute's 
history, equipment, and its integration into the ARD, the report also argues the "exceptional posi-
tion" of the SFB: "Normally, it would only have a 5% share (700.000 paying viewers in West Ber-
lin) of the overall program. Owing to its exceptional geographic location at the center of the GDR's 
territory and the resulting mission of ideological diversion, it has been tasked with a higher pro-
gram share" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Information" 2). After the paper has ex-
posed the SFB as the main enemy of the GDR, it continues to pull the institute to pieces: "In the 
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years after its establishment (1953), the SFB has confirmed itself to be one of the worst anticom-
munist and most revanchist organizations of imperialist reaction" (2). According to the report, the 
institute recruited its employees "from the Goebbels ministry, the former 'Reichs'rundfunk and the 
SA ... complemented ... by notorious communist haters and enemies of any form of detente" 
(Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Information" 2; it is known today, however, that the em-
ployment of former Nazis at West German radio, television, and newspapers has been standard 
practice, see, e.g., Hachmeister and Siering). The paper goes on to identify the SFB's reports be-
longing to the series "Mitteldeutsches Tagebuch," "Diesseits und jenseits der Zonengrenzen," as 
well as the coverage on the events of 17 July 1953 (the uprising in East Berlin) as "agitation seri-
als" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Information" 4). Yet, the SFB was not only harshly 
attacked because of its program, it was even accused of assaults on the GDR itself. In this context, 
it seemed like a harmless allegation that the SFB took "a leading role in seducing GDR citizens into 
illegally leaving their homeland" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Information" 4). The 
accusations relating to events that were purported to have occurred after the Berlin Wall was built 
became increasingly absurd: "After 13 August 1961, the SFB operated as an organizer of armed 
provocation against the national border of the GDR in cooperation with the Springer corporate 
group (with which it maintains close ties). For example, the SFB financed the provocateur who 
killed corporal Reinhold Huhn of the GDR border guard of on 18 June 1962 and positioned an out-
side broadcast van in the immediate vicinity of the location where the murder would later take 
place" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Information" 4-5). At this point, the coverage sur-
rounding the state committee has departed from a "factual" listing of the information about its 
Western rival. The defamatory statements quoted here seem to read like they were taken from a 
bad spy novel. They do not, however, offer those employed at the GDR's television stations any 
assistance in the day-to-day battle for the viewers. In sum, on the one hand, the directorial and 
managerial bodies of GDR television had objective and factual information available to them that 
had been collected through meticulous research in West German sources. On the other hand, the 
ideologically colored assessment of the "intentions" of West German television can only be judged 
as very speculative and outright lurid. Today, we can only speculate whether the authors of the 
report to the committee actually believed that West German television was preparing the popula-
tion for a war or that the SFB employed "criminal elements" to perpetrate "crimes along the na-
tional border" (Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv Babelsberg, "Information" 5). We can assume that it is 
more likely that this was propaganda directed inward -- not least to motivate GDR television's own 
employees to do their best "in the daily confrontation of the classes with the enemy" 
(Bundesarchiv Berlin DY 30-478 II/9). 
By the mid 1970s, the predominant concern about the GDR audience's migration to West Ger-
man television channels was no longer speculation only. It had become a hard fact supported by 
information on audience ratings and audience participation, all available to the television commit-
tee. This data and a freer discussion of the impact of West German television in East Germany led 
to the development that GDR television used its own program to take a more aggressive role 
against the competition. Also, considerations of program planning were now more openly dis-
cussed against the background of West German program structures. As the most significant up-to-
date news show of GDR television, "Aktuelle Kamera" (a program of evening news), obviously en-
joyed a special status. However, beyond its ideological role it also marked the beginning of "prime 
time" within the program. Its time slot and duration dictated to some extent the evening program, 
while from an ideological perspective the selection of its time slot was decided primarily by "the 
increasingly difficult fight to be the first television channel to inform viewers and to interpret news" 
(Bundesarchiv Berlin DR 8-141, "Stand und Tendenzen" 23). In later plans, the fact that this con-
cept was not implemented is explained with the results of polls of viewers. Interestingly, it were 
crime and humor series that achieved the most positive audience response and Sunday evening as 
a rule enjoyed relatively stable audience ratings (Bundesarchiv Berlin DY 30 IV 2-2.033-43 20-21). 
A different kind of program on this most important day of the week as far as the number of view-
ers is concerned, for example a journalistic program, would obviously have been more desirable 
from an ideological viewpoint, but was just as obviously unthinkable in the face of the competition 
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from West Germany: "If good audience response is to be preserved and our adversary is to remain 
switched off for the most part ... then the basic tendencies of the audience's expectations of enter-
tainment, suspense, and cheeriness for the Sunday evening program need to be met" 
(Bundesarchiv Berlin DY 30 IV 2-2.033-43 22). And similar lines of reasoning can be found about 
the entire daily program, the late-afternoon program as well as the late-night program. Apparent-
ly, the influence of West German entertainment did not only extend to the distribution of the pro-
gram blocks to the weekdays but began to put the individual formats under pressure as well. This 
can be seen in the criticism of East German television's journalistic broadcasts, which had great 
acceptance problems with the audience, as was stated above. Additionally, their West German 
counterparts began to integrate elements of entertainment into their journalistically-oriented 
shows, thus attempting to make it attractive to their audience and this development appeared 
threatening to the directors of GDR television. 
 The developments of GDR television programming between 1968 and 1974 can be summa-
rized as follows: Under government directives as well as based on evidence of research data, tele-
vision programming intensifies its orientation towards the wishes of GDR audience and as a result 
of this audience orientation and the competition with West German television, the entertainment 
profile of programming increases significantly. On the political and ideological side within GDR tel-
evision programming and program management, West German television is criticized for trying to 
poach East German viewers with the goal of influencing them ideologically; in turn, this gives rise 
to attempting to keep the audience tuned to East German television, mainly by the aforesaid in-
crease of entertainment programs and orientation. This combined effort of politico-ideological con-
sideration and entertainment orientation is to a large extent a reaction to the impact of West Ger-
man television in the GDR with the result of GDR television turning to entertainment to a much a 
higher extent than previously. In turn, the "home-grown" output of entertainment in GDR televi-
sion results in a higher level of audience and a specific GDR television culture. It is an area of fur-
ther research to analyse the move towards entertainment comparatively, namely the history of the 
move towards more entertainment in West Germany as compared with the same in East Germany 
as well as in other television systems of the time. 
 
Note: The above paper is an updated version of Claudia Dittmar, "Das 'feindliche Fernsehen' - das DDR-
Fernsehen und der ständige Krieg im Äther." Die Überwindung der Langeweile? Zur Programmentwicklung des 
DDR-Fernsehens 1968 bis 1974. Ed. Claudia Dittmar and Susanne Vollberg. Leipzig: Universitätsverlag, 2002. 
99-146. 
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